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Abstract
Vehicular security was long limited to physical security – to prevent theft.
However, the trend of adding more comfort functions and delegating advanced
driving tasks back to the vehicle increased the magnitude of attacks, making
cybersecurity inevitable. Attackers only need to nd one vulnerability in the
myriad of electronic control units (ECUs) and communication technologies
used in a vehicle to compromise its functions. Vehicles might also be attacked
by the owners, who want to modify or even disable certain vehicle functions.
Many dierent parties are involved in the development of such a complex
system as the functions are distributed over more than 100 ECUs, making it
dicult to get an overall picture of the achieved security. Therefore, moving
towards a standardised security framework tailored for the automotive domain
is necessary.
In this thesis we study various safety and security standards and proposed
frameworks from dierent industrial domains with respect to their way of
classifying demands in the form of levels and their methods to derive require-
ments. In our proposed framework, we suggest security levels appropriate
for automotive systems and continue with a mapping between these security
levels and identied security mechanisms and design rules to provide basic
security. We further study in detail a mechanism which provides freshness
to authenticated messages, namely AUTOSAR SecOC Prole 3, and present
a novel extension that oers a faster synchronisation between ECUs and
reduces the number of required messages for synchronisation.
Keywords: Vehicular Security, In-Vehicle Network, Security Classication,
Freshness
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Thesis Summary
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Introduction
1 Motivation
In the automotive domain, security was long limited to preventing unautho-
rised individuals from physically accessing vehicles. Media-players, navi-
gation systems and functions that take over driving tasks, such as Cruise
Control (CC) or Adaptive CC (ACC), have increased the comfort, extended the
functionality of vehicles and provided a better driving experience. However,
this still ongoing trend of adding advanced driving functionality requires more
computing resources and more complex software – it marks the beginning of
a new era of automotive security. The vehicle does not interact only with the
driver anymore, interactions have become possible through the media player,
mobile phones, other vehicles and infrastructure, e. g., trac lights and road
warnings. However, these new ways of interaction and control also cleared
the way for attackers, making cybersecurity a necessity for vehicles.
Challenges and limitations specic to the automotive domain make it
dicult to directly apply state-of-the-art security solutions designed for tradi-
tional IT systems. Moreover, the complexity of modern vehicles and the large
number of components and developers as well as dierent parties involved
make it increasingly dicult to get an overall picture of the achieved level of
security in a vehicle. Therefore, it is necessary to work towards a security
standard that is tailored for connected vehicles.
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2 Background
Vehicles have evolved from being purely mechanical to becoming a network
of Electrical and/or Electronic (E/E) systems. A reference architecture of
such a connected vehicle is shown in Figure 1. Related functions, e. g., radar
and cameras for perception, are grouped into separate network segments
which are interconnected through gateways. The underlying network bus
diers depending on the information the microcontrollers, so-called Electronic
Control Units (ECUs), exchange. Controller Area Network (CAN) [1] is a
relatively old network bus developed in 1983 and still in use in some segments,
as it only requires a twisted pair cable and can oer real time guarantees.
Ethernet on the other hand is mainly used for high bandwidth applications,
such as streaming of video and sensor data.
Figure 1: Reference architecture of a connected vehicle [2].
Securing such a system requires security by design, starting from consid-
ering an appropriate network architecture to hardware and software security
measures to be implemented. The rst attempt towards standardising best
practices for the automotive domain is SAE J3061, Cybersecurity Guidebook for
Cyber-physical Vehicle Systems. As a result, ISO/SAE 21434 [3], Road vehicles –
Cybersecurity Engineering, has started in 2016 as a joint work between SAE
and ISO. The standard is planned to be published in October 2019 and aims at
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establishing a common base for the various stakeholders by specifying the
requirements for cybersecurity risk management.
Safety and Security. The safety of individuals is of highest importance
when developing automotive systems. ISO 26262 denes safety as the “absence
of unreasonable risk” [4, p.14] and further species functional safety as the
“absence of unreasonable risk due to hazards caused bymalfunctioning behaviour
of E/E systems” [4, p.8]. Cybersecurity on the other hand is concerned with
individuals and organisations who want to gain unauthorised access to the
system or even want to harm others [5]. The common goal of functional
safety and cybersecurity is to protect individuals from harm, yet cybersecurity
also aims to protect information. Reasons for protecting information may
be safety-related, e. g., authenticating messages that contain the brake signal
and availability measures, but are not limited to safety. Encrypting intel-
lectual property, such as rmware, or encrypting personal information for
maintaining privacy rights may be other rationales for protecting information.
The fundamental dierence between safety and security is that security
is about defending against attackers and organisations who are determined to
nd a vulnerability in order to achieve their goal which ultimately increases
the complexity of necessary measures. Safety, on the other hand, deals with
random faults.
The threat is real. Vehicles have not been targets of large-scale attacks yet,
nevertheless, research by Checkoway et al. [6] dating back to 2011 already
proved that attacks through the media player and the Tire-Pressure Monitor-
ing System (TPMS) are possible. Over the years more and more reports about
vulnerabilities concerning vehicles have been published [7–13]. Presumably,
the most signicant hack in the past is the “Jeep Cherokee Hack” [7] by
Miller and Valasek which resulted in a recall of 1.4 million cars in the United
States [14]. The disclosed vulnerabilities of connected vehicles range from
cross-site scripting to exploiting vulnerabilities through WiFi and cellular
networks.
Threats are not limited to attackers having the intent to steal informa-
tion or harm other people. The attacker might be even the owner of the
vehicle, who has complete physical access without time restrictions. Truck
manufacturers, for instance, highlight the problem of illegal manipulation
or modications of heavy duty vehicles by the truck operators themselves.
AdBlue, a diesel exhaust uid, is used in heavy duty vehicles to reduce the
nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions. Some operators, however, consider purely
the costs of AdBlue, regardless of the reduction in NOx emissions, and started
to install “AdBlue emulators” to circumvent the AdBlue injection system [15].
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The owners do not even need to be malicious in order to compromise the
safety and security of the vehicle. A vulnerability published in April 2019 [16]
showed that it is possible to locate and monitor tens of thousands of vehicles
that use a specic GPS tracker which was installed by the owners. In certain
cases it would have been even possible to turn o the engine in case this
feature was enabled during the installation of the tracking device and the
vehicle was driving at less than 20 km/h. This hack was possible due to the
use of the same default password for all customers who signed up for the
service.
Complexity of Automotive Systems. Vehicles dier in many ways from
traditional computer systems. This distinctness, which is outlined below,
makes it dicult for vehicle manufacturers to directly deploy well-established
methods and security mechanisms, e. g., Common Criteria [17], NIST FIPS
199 [18] and the corresponding security and privacy controls [19], in their
domain.
• Lifetime. The expected lifetime of a vehicle is 150,000 – 300,000 km [20],
which corresponds to up to 20 – 25 years for a passenger car. Through-
out this time, it is essential and necessary to keep the vehicle safe and
secure.
• Compliance to standards. Some vehicle types may need to adhere
to certain standards. SAE J1939 [21], for instance, is a standard for
heavy duty vehicles that denes the content of specic frames sent on
the vehicular network in order to provide interoperability between the
truck and a variety of third-party equipment.
• Alignmentwith safety. Security mechanisms need to be implemented
in compliance with the requirements of the functional safety standard
for road vehicles, namely ISO 26262 [22]. Moreover, methods for de-
signing secure vehicles should be aligned, where possible, with this
standard as it found broad acceptance in industry.
• Interplay between safety and security. The passenger’s safety has
to be maintained in all situations. Therefore, it is of utmost importance
that safety and security mechanisms do not counter their intended
functionality.
• Maintenance. Authorised workshops need to be able to replace spare
parts even in an oine environment.
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• Energy utilisation. Power consumption is an important factor that
needs to be considered as it aects the fuel consumption and may cause
problems with heat dissipation.
• Performance of ECUs. Many ECUs deployed in today’s vehicles do
not have enough resources to implement new security functions to
perform encryption or sign messages.
• Costs. Assuming that ECUs with hardware accelerated security fea-
tures and secure storage cost 1 USD more than the version without, it
is apparent that deploying them to a passenger vehicle comprising of
more than 100 ECUs means a signicant impact on revenue. For in-
stance, a manufacturer producing 1,000,000 passenger cars a year with
each including 100 ECUs would lose 100,000,000 USD in revenue per
year. However, the necessity of securing connected vehicles should not
only be considered as loss in revenue, as it contributes to maintaining
the privacy and safety of the passengers and their surroundings.
3 State of the Art and Challenges
Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) is an important step during the
concept and development phases of a secure system. This analysis supports
architects in identifying the assets and corresponding threats of a system,
and provides classiers for security demands in the form of security levels
for further prioritisation and assignment of appropriate security measures.
Furthermore, we focus on one specic security attribute, freshness, which
prevents attackers from retransmitting old authenticated messages.
3.1 Threat Analysis
TARA is a technique to identify and rate the risk or security demands of a
system. Figure 2 illustrates the steps when performing a TARA. First, the
system is analysed and assets that need to be protected from certain threats
are identied. An evaluation follows which results in a classication of the
security demands and risks in form of levels. SAE J3061 [5] describes a
lifecycle process framework including how to apply TARA in the concept
phase.
Automotive specic TARA techniques referred to in the SAE J3061 guide-
book include EVITA [23] and HEAVENS [24]. Examples of parameters con-
sidered in the HEAVENS TARA for evaluating the security demands are the
knowledge of the attacker, window of opportunity, knowledge about the
7
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Item Thread Knowledge . . .
Braking Spoong Standard . . .
Braking Tampering Restricted . . .
Speed Spoong Standard . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
TARA 
−
low
medium
high
critical

Classication
Figure 2: Overview of the steps from analysing the system, performing a
TARA and getting a classication.
target, and nancial and safety impact. These parameters are rated with nu-
merical values for each asset/threat combination and consequently combined
to a single value, the security level.
Microsoft STRIDE [25] is a technique to identify the assets and threats
of a system. STRIDE classies threats in six categories: spoong, tamper-
ing, repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service, and elevation of
privilege. Its applicability in automotive systems has been discussed and
shown [24, 26, 27].
3.2 Security Classification and Requirements Engineering
As we mentioned, the result of the TARA is often referred to as risk or security
level. These levels are further used to reect the demands placed on func-
tions, ECUs, and subnets. As an example, HEAVENS uses the outcome of the
TARA for prioritisation and to guide engineers in manually deriving security
requirements. The structure of these security levels diers between various
presented models, for instance, HEAVENS uses a single value in the range
of 0 to 4, whereas EVITA uses a vector of four elements to describe the risk
with values ranging from 0 to 7. This variation of how security demands are
expressed between dierent security models brings up the question: What is
the desired structure to classify security demands for the design and development
of connected vehicles?
Methods to classify security demands, respectively the risk of security
threats, in form of levels have been proposed by various researchers. Much
attention has been paid to investigate ways to combine safety and security in
one framework [26–29]. A comparison of safety classications throughout
dierent domains has been carried out by Blanquart et al. [30]. Security
frameworks developed for the automotive domain mainly focus on threat
identication and risk assessment [23, 24]. The mapping from security levels
directly to dened security requirements has been addressed in standards
such as NIST SP 800-53 [19] and IEC 63442 [31]. Connected Vehicles Pilot
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Development Phase 1 [32] applies NIST FIPS PUB 199 [18] and NIST SP 800-
53 to vehicular systems. However, the resulting security requirements do
not cover the needs of the automotive domain in depth, as the previously
mentioned two NIST publications have been designed for security in federal
information systems.
3.3 Freshness
The purpose of authenticating messages is (1) to ensure that the content has
not been tampered with, and (2) to assure that the sender is indeed the correct
source of the message. Message Authentication Codes (MACs) are commonly
used for authenticating messages. They are similar to hash functions, but
additionally require a secret key in order to full the requirement of being
resistant to manipulation. Freshness is a security property that provides
additionally means to ensure that messages are fresh, i. e., they have not
been replayed by an attacker. The simplest solution to provide freshness in
authenticated messages is to include a freshness value in form of a counter or
timestamp with each message when generating the MAC.
The receiver needs to know the MAC and freshness value of the message
to correctly verify its authenticity and freshness. In networks with limited
bandwidth and already high bus load, it may not be possible to send both the
MAC and freshness value in full length with each message and thus, these
values need to be truncated. The recommended minimum length by NIST SP
800-38B [33] for the truncated MAC is 64 bits, however, a shorter truncated
MAC can be used when other measures, such as limiting the attempts for
verifying an authenticated message, are in place. Sending a truncated fresh-
ness value requires additional mechanisms to synchronise this value between
the dierent entities, as all entities need this information for generating and
verifying messages.
The truncation of the freshness value is necessary in automotive networks
as it has to be possible to deploy such solutions also on CAN [1]. The CAN
bus has a maximum bit rate of 1 Mbit/s and is already highly utilised in
vehicles. Given this requirement to not increase the bandwidth more than
necessary, it is evident that the freshness value needs to be truncated and thus
synchronised between senders and receivers. AUTOSAR, an open system
platform for vehicles, describes [34] three security proles for authenticating
messages. One of these proles, SecOC Prole 3, denes also a mechanism
to synchronise the freshness value. Other solutions [35, 36] either require
a modication of the CAN bus transceiver or require, as Prole 3 does, a
periodic synchronisation of the freshness value.
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4 Research estions
This thesis contributes to the following research questions.
RQ1 How to express security demands for the design and development of
connected vehicles?
RQ2 How to move forward from unique security requirements of individual
systems to predened security requirements?
RQ3 What are suitable security mechanisms for the automotive domain and
how can they be used in a framework?
RQ4 What are the limitations and possible design considerations when im-
plementing a freshness mechanism for authenticated messages in auto-
motive systems?
5 Contributions
Previous research on security frameworks for connected vehicles has focussed
on threat analysis, methods to combine safety and security, and techniques
to manually derive security requirements.
In this work, we rst study existing safety and security standards and
frameworks from dierent domains in order to propose a suitable structure for
security levels, e. g., a single value or a vector to express the security demands.
With this classication of security demands in place, we continue to explore
ways to directly move towards security requirements, respectively mandatory
security mechanisms and design rules, without the need to manually derive
security requirements by rst dening high-level security requirements and
dividing them in technical security requirements. Our proposed framework
depends only on the resulting security levels from the conducted TARA and
aims at providing basic security. Lastly, we study a solution for freshness
in authenticated messages and present an extension which copes with the
limitations we have identied when implementing such a method.
SecurityClassication andRequirements Engineering [37,38]. In Pa-
per 1 [37], we address research questions RQ1 and RQ2. We propose a structure
for security levels for the automotive domain based on an analysis of various
standards and frameworks across dierent industrial domains, focussing on
the way security or safety demands are expressed. The result of this analysis
of security standards and frameworks showed that the classication of secu-
rity diers signicantly, whereas all studied safety standards use the same
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structure. In addition, we also investigate how the studied standards and
frameworks move from safety or security levels to requirements: Do they
provide guidance or processes to dene security requirements/goals? Do they
oer a direct transition from the resulting levels to specic requirements?
Continuing at the point of having a structure to describe security de-
mands, we contribute in Paper 2 [38] to research questions RQ2 and RQ3.
We propose a framework that supports architects and engineers in obtaining
basic security requirements that only depend on the result of TARA. This
way, developers are able to discover at an early stage if there are any conicts
between basic security requirements and safety measures. Moreover, this
standardised method provides consistency of security requirements through-
out an organisation and its suppliers, increases traceability of the security
demands and required security mechanisms, and enables developers to fo-
cus on formulating additional application-specic security requirements that
need special attention.
Freshness [39]. We contribute to research question RQ4, by studying AU-
TOSAR SecOC Prole 3 and providing details about the situations in which
Prole 3 is not able to correctly verify authenticated messages when trun-
cated freshness values are transmitted. Based on this analysis we also identify
design consideration and limitations, and further propose a novel extension
of Prole 3 that addresses them. Our suggested improvements have been
implemented on a test bed consisting of three ECUs and evaluated in terms
of exibility, time to resynchronise the freshness value and control messages
needed for synchronisation.
6 Conclusion and Outlook
Securing modern vehicles has become more important as vehicles are not
only connected to the Internet. Vehicles are also going to be interconnected
with each other and with the road infrastructure, such as trac lights. In addi-
tion, the increased capabilities of vehicles, e. g., automated driving assistance,
magnies the extent to which an attacker will be able to control the vehicle.
The research presented in this thesis starts with investigating how secu-
rity demands in the form of security levels should be expressed for further
use in product development. By providing a framework that directly assigns
security requirements, i. e., security mechanisms and design rules, to these
security levels, it is possible to extract the requirements needed to be imple-
mented and possible conicts with the safety requirements in an early stage
of development. Next, we focussed on one specic security mechanism that
11
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provides freshness for authenticated messages, namely AUTOSAR SecOC Pro-
le 3. Based on an analysis of the method which synchronises the freshness
value and a discussion on the limitations and design considerations of such
a method, we propose an extension of this mechanism that allows a faster
synchronisation and requires less bandwidth in terms of synchronisation
messages that need to be sent.
Figure 3 provides an overview of current research publications and their
directions, including future work. Paper 1 and Paper 2 are focussing on the
use of security levels and how to further continue with a framework that
directly assigns security mechanisms to be implemented to a function, ECU or
network segment. Paper 3 concentrates on one specic mechanism identied
in Paper 2.
Paper A [40]
Team Halmstad
Approach to Co-
operative Driving
in the Grand Co-
operative Driving
Challenge 2016
Paper B [41]
Modelling the Level of
Trust in a Cooperative
Automated Vehicle
Control System
Paper E
V2X and cloud-
based Intrusion
Detection Mechanisms
Paper F
Principles for
Resilient Vehicles
Paper 2 [38]
Towards a Stan-
dardized Mapping
from Automotive
Security Levels to
Security Mechanisms
Paper C
Follow-up paper of
Paper 2 that includes
more use-cases and
discussions on how to
apply the framework
Paper 1 [37]
Open Problems when
Mapping Automotive
Security Levels to
System Requirements
Paper 3 [39]
Extending AU-
TOSAR’s Counter-
based Solution
for Freshness of
Authenticated
Messages in Vehicles
Paper D
Evaluation of
Virtualisation
Techniques for
Resilient Vehicles
Not included
in Lic. thesis
Included in Lic. thesis
Planned/Future Work
Figure 3: Research publications and planned future work.
As Paper 2 is currently only validated by an industrial partner given a
simple use case, a follow-up is planned on this framework to apply more
(complex) use cases to verify the usability of the proposed framework, as
well as the assignment of security mechanisms to security levels (Paper C).
Paper D plans to explore another security mechanism, namely virtualisation.
The main idea is to set up a test bed using open source software solutions and
to evaluate dierent techniques, i. e., container-based and hypervisor-based
virtualisation, in regard to security and resiliency of vehicles.
Paper A [40] and Paper B [41] focus on vehicles cooperating with each
other in order to perform a certain action, such as eciently crossing an inter-
section. Paper A gives an overview of an implemented software architecture
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of a cooperative vehicle designed and developed for the Grand Cooperative
Driving Challenge (GCDC) in 2016. Paper B [41] focusses on one specic
module, the trust system, which veries information received from other
vehicles at system level and associates a so-called trust index with each ve-
hicle which is further used for decision making of cooperative actions. A
verication on system level is necessary as securely transmitted information
might still contain incorrect or faulty information as a result of, for instance,
malfunctioning sensors. A planned continuation of Paper B is to investigate
cloud-based mechanisms to verify information received from other entities
and extend the proposed trust index accordingly (Paper E). When having
an intrusion detection system in place it is also necessary to decide on the
actions when an intrusion or corruption of information is detected (Paper F).
13

Papers Overview
Paper 1: Open Problems when Mapping Automotive
Security Levels to System Requirements [37]
T. Rosenstatter, T. Olovsson
This paper provides an analysis of standards and frameworks for the automo-
tive and other industrial domains in respect to their methodology on how they
classify security, respectively safety. A classication of security is necessary in
order to indicate the security demands of a certain function or ECU. We rst
highlight the challenges that the automotive domain faces when designing
and developing secure systems. Second, we study how selected standards and
frameworks structure the classier for their corresponding domain. Lastly, we
propose a structure for automotive security levels that considers the identied
challenges which are specic to the automotive domain. In this paper, we
• provide a study of safety and security standards, along with proposed
security models and frameworks for the automotive domain.
• propose methods for how to move forward from unique requirements
of individual systems and identied security levels to a set of mandatory
requirements, design rules and security mechanisms.
• show that such requirements should be based on the security level of
the function to be implemented.
• describe the benets with having such a framework in place when
dealing with third-party developed functionality.
Appeared in: Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Vehicle Technol-
ogy and Intelligent Transport Systems, VEHITS 2018, Funchal, Madeira, Portugal,
March 16-18, 2018
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Paper 2: Towards a Standardized Mapping from Au-
tomotive Security Levels to Security Mechanisms [38]
T. Rosenstatter, T. Olovsson
We continue at the point of having performed a TARA resulting in a set of Se-
curity Levels for each identied asset, which can be a function, a vehicle ECU,
or even a network segment. The proposed framework guides designers and
engineers in identifying necessary security mechanisms to be implemented
based on a mapping from Security Levels (SLs) to a list of security mechanisms.
In this paper, we have identied appropriate security mechanisms suitable
for automotive systems and assigned them to particular SLs. We additionally
show how to apply our proposed framework to an automotive use case, which
has been veried by a vehicle manufacturer. By applying this framework, we
• provide a strict rule-set which fulls basic security demands to allow
designers to focus on application specic requirements that are not
covered,
• allow designers to identify conicts and dependencies between safety
and security requirements in an early stage of development, and
• provide a common ground for required security mechanisms to be
implemented between vehicle manufacturers and their suppliers.
Appeared in: 21st International Conference on Intelligent Transportation Sys-
tems, ITSC 2018, Maui, HI, USA, November 4-7, 2018
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Paper 3: Extending AUTOSAR’s Counter-based Solu-
tion for Freshness of Authenticated Messages in Ve-
hicles [39]
T. Rosenstatter, C. Sandberg, T. Olovsson
Freshness is a security property that protects against replay attacks of authen-
ticated messages. AUTOSAR, an open system platform for vehicles, describes
three so-called SecOC Proles for authenticating messages sent over vehicular
networks. Two of the described security proles also provide freshness; one
prole is using a single counter, the other one, namely SecOC Prole 3, uses
a counter that is divided into several sub-counters and additionally provides
a method for synchronising it. Synchronisation of this counter or Freshness
Value (FV) needs to be in place as it is not feasible to send the complete FV
on a highly utilised network.
In this paper, we analyse Prole 3 while focussing on usability and its
ability to synchronise the counter value, discuss design considerations and
limitations of such a mechanism that provides freshness using a counter, and
lastly, we propose improvements on Prole 3 that address the identied short-
comings. Our novel approach has been implemented on test bed consisting of
three vehicle ECUs and has been further validated in regard to its exibility
for synchronisation, faster resynchronisation when a receiving ECU is out of
sync, and the reduction of necessary control messages that need to be sent
on the bus. In this paper, we
• discuss design considerations and limitations when implementing a
freshness mechanism in vehicles.
• identify the situations in which it is not possible to recover the correct
freshness value when only a truncated freshness value is transmitted
with every message.
• propose an extension of AUTOSAR SecOC Prole 3 which allows faster
resynchronisation and requires less synchronisation messages to be
transmitted.
In submission, 2019
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